Azerbaijan, Baku, Feb. 25 / Trend , D. Ibrahimova/
Discrepancy in calculating Iran's low-enriched uranium by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to technical reasons, rather than Tehran's attempt to cover up the real volume.
"The IAEA figures previously were based on estimates and estimates were using Iranian methods and figures," European expert for nuclear weapons Shannon Kile told Trend in a telephone conversation. The most recent report was based on IAEA's own estimates, he added.
According to IAEA most recent report, Iran has much more low-enriched uranium than expected. The amount of uranium in Iran hit 1,010 kilogram. From December to late January, Iran bought only 171 kilograms. According to the report published in November 2008, Iran possessed only 630 kilogram of low-enriched uranium.
IAEA is world's leading international governmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. IAEA was established at the UN in 1957 as an autonomous organization.
Experts said that shortage in IAEA report is not linked to Iran's attempt to hide the actual volume of produced low-enriched uranium.
Iran did not try to hide uranium from the IAEA experts as Israel and some other states suggest, head of the Head of Nuclear Weapons Project at Swedish SIPRI institute Kile said. IAEA experts visit Iran's nuclear facilities once a year. Now they cooperate with Iran's nuclear agency in an effort to improve skills of agency's staff to estimate nuclear materials and techniques, he said to Trend in a telephone conversation.
The United States and some European countries are concerned with the development of Iran's nuclear program. They fear Iran will obtain nuclear weapon. Iran claims it enriches uranium for peaceful purposes.
As a part of global efforts to prevent nuclear weapon dissemination, the IAEA performs inspections so that nuclear materials will not be used for military purposes. Agency's inspectors control all declared nuclear materials, conduct remote control and check documents as soon as new member signs safeguard agreement.
The fact that it is technically difficult to track amount of low-enriched uranium can be a reason for inaccurate estimation.
"Low-enriched uranium is produced as hexoftorid in centrifuges. Therefore it is technically difficult to track how much it has been produced," expert on Iran Vladimir Yevseyev said. "This is not a metal that can be weighed."
On the other hand, there is no full control on this material's production in Natanz in addition to technical difficulties.
Tehran limited access of the IAEA inspectors to perform inspections in country's nuclear facilities any time by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty additional protocol.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed on July 1, 1968 and took effect on March 5, 1970. A total of 178 states signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as of April 1, 2005. The treaty was prolonged for unlimited duration on May 11, 1995.
"The problem of IAEA is that hey can not give credible quarantines that there is no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran," Kile said.
Iranian expert on internal issues Saeed Yari said the amount of uranium stated in the last IAEA report is not true as Iran does not have opportunities to enrich uranium in large volumes.
According to the IAEA, Iran had 3,800 active centrifuges as of November 2008. A total of 164 centrifuges were commissioned over the last two months.
"Iran has an opportunity to buy 1,010 kilogram of uranium in a few months. Probably, the IAEA Director General meant Iran's potential," Iran National Interests Protection Organization Secretary General Saeed Yari told Trend in a telephone conversation.
However, U.S. expert on Iran Mark Katz believes that inaccuracy in the IAEA report might be related to the fact that Tehran hid its activities and the accumulated amount of low-enriched uranium.
"Whatever the answer, it is clear that Iran is now farther along in its nuclear program than Tehran has claimed," George Mason University Political Science Professor Mark Katz wrote to Trend in an email.
Experts urged for a stricter control over nuclear facilities in Iran.
Yevseyev said one should not blame the IAEA, as the matter is a supplementary protocol of 1997 compliance with which Iran suspended.
"Iran should allow implementation of the supplementary protocol. Protocol acting on the territory of Iran would prevent omissions of significant quantity of fissile substances," he said.
T.Jafarov, Moscow-based R.Agayev and E.Tariverdiyeva contributed to the article.
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