Azerbaijan, Baku, Dec. 26 / Trend E.Ostapenko /
Trend exclusive interview with Russia's Permanent Representative to the international organizations in Vienna Alexander Zmeyevskiy .
Trend : The IAEA inspectors monitored Iran's Fordo nuclear enrichment facility located near Gum three times. How do you think, why this plant kept secret? Were suspicions about Iran's nuclear program increased following the discovery of this plant, or vice versa?
Zmeyevskiy: Iran explains that the original version of the document establishing procedures for notifying the IAEA of new nuclear facilities commits the country to inform the agency 180 days before the commencement of its work with nuclear material, but not immediately after the decision to build, as the later version of the same document required. This version is widely spread now.
However, the IAEA thinks that Tehran should follow a contemporary version of the agreement, specifying an earlier date of notification. The IAEA Director General's latest report to the IAEA Board's November session noted that Iran's delay in providing information about nuclear enrichment facility located near the Gum is not conducive to confidence-building.
Q: Iran is keen to establish 10 more factories to enrich uranium stating that the plant's production capacity will not yield to the plant in Natanz. Do you think Iran to have enough uranium reserves to construct so many plants? Do you assess Iran's statements as constructive, given the IAEA Board's recent resolution?
A: The IAEA Director General's previous reports on capacities of the Iranian uranium mining companies, say that Iran's explored uranium reserves are small. However, the point is that the world's enrichment facilities locate in countries that do not produce uranium.
In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1737, Iran must suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment. The UN Security Council confirmed this requirement in its subsequent resolutions, as well as in the IAEA Board's recent resolution. When evaluating the statements and actions of the Iranian leadership we proceed just from this.
Q: Recently, the Times newspaper reported that Iran is testing a key component needed to build an atomic bomb, referring to secret documents from an unknown source. How realistic does the fact that such documents exist in reality seem to you? Do you hold information on this subject? Is this "news" an attempt of the Western countries to find "evidence" to Iran's nuclear program's military orientation?
A: Indeed, the press publicized many articles on this topic. In its work Russia's representative office relies on the IAEA's conclusions and they do not contain any conclusions about the presence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. There are assumptions that the agency's some members submitted several documents to the secretariat, but this needs to be verified.
Regarding our position towards this issue, we have repeatedly expressed interest in clarifying all outstanding issues on Iran's nuclear program to enable the IAEA to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Q: Don't you think that any sanctions primarily affect the Iranian people's status and will promote national unity in confronting the West, which would undoubtedly weaken the opposition?
A: As Russia's Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna, for me it is difficult to speak on the subject not included in the IAEA purview. If and when this issue arises, I am sure the UN Security Council's debate will take all related aspects into account.
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