Sometimes we can observe that the start that seemed to be a good one turns into the disaster for the general order, completing the list of hazardous segments. The Armenian-Iranian cooperation can be cited as a clear example in this regard.
Tehran firmly assured that helping Armenia survive in the difficult situation is a good cause. The essence is not even in the fact that this stiffness is a logical consequence of a dangerous and militant policy pursued by Yerevan towards its neighbors. Assistance to the aggressor, when the sane forces require an adequacy and predictability from the violator of international law, is nothing more than indulgence of the invader. Iran's assistance to Armenia should be viewed just from this point of view. And this assistance is quite significant.
Armenia, landlocked country that doomed to rely on modest opportunities of the Lars checkpoint in Georgia, is actively supported by Iran, which has shouldered all the burden of ensuring the Armenian economy.
Continuously, the cargo sent to Armenia from abroad are delivered to the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, in the Persian Gulf, and then reloaded in the direction of the Iranian-Armenian border. The two neighboring countries have established a permanent transport and communication bridge, on which heavy tracks move. However, there is one important nuance here: loaded trucks are moving in the northern direction and returning empty.
Iran performs an exclusive mission for Armenia at a time when, Azerbaijan, Turkey and finally the international organizations call the aggressor country to order.
Indeed, Iran's most significant assistance to Armenia is felt in the fuel and energy complex. Under this co-operation, Yerevan draws a zero balance for several years. That is, the northern entity entirely depends on the southern partner, in a nutshell, hangs around its neck. Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsesian said that now the fuel and energy complex covers more than 80 percent of the Armenian-Iranian bilateral trade, acquiring an investment package worth over $ 450 million.
This gives ground to say that Iran is not only an oxygen bag for Armenia, but also duplicating economic organism, which allows the aggressor country to survive at a time when it faced the natural and geopolitical problems.
The Iranian political circles, where, as we know, there is a caste of officials who know the subject of international practice, cannot be unaware of this. But, Tehran approached Yerevan for two reasons. On the one hand, it was a measure of the forced nature, because Iran is surrounded mainly by non-friends countries. On the other hand, Iran made friends with Armenia against Azerbaijan.
A protest force against Baku was so furious, that the Iranians turned a blind eye to the characteristic duplicity of Yerevan, actively 'flirting' with the West.
In light of these realities, all is logically explicable, except one. Why did Tehran, having a reliable alternative in the form of building profitable relationships with Azerbaijan, choose halved-Armenia?
It is understandable that the country had problems with Azerbaijan over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, division of the oil and gas fields in the sea and something else. However, 20 years ago, as today, Iran needed Azerbaijan more than Armenia. At a time when the European nations approach Baku in expectation of a large positive from the cooperation, when an advantageous partnership with Russia, Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries is gaining momentum, then the vacuum in the Azerbaijani-Iranian trade and economic relations could only cause confusion. And if one adds on the unfriendly acts, which involve the Iranian political, military and religious officials, then the picture even turns to be nonsense.
Tehran, being aware of that Yerevan shamelessly plays out on two fronts and shows miracles of hypocrisy, continues to cooperate with Armenia by unwittingly supporting its aggressive expansionist policy against Azerbaijan.
Baku has always been set on good-neighborliness with Tehran, being in the area of predictability. Azerbaijan, whose economy now makes up over 80 percent of the regional industry, achieved successes thanks to its focus on the results with partners through goodwill, which is the key to success in any partnership. And if Iran did not use its opportunities of rapprochement with Azerbaijan, then reasons of this failure must be sought in the complex of Tehran's priorities. Baku has never closed the door for smooth and long-term relations with all countries, including Iran. Armenia once again proved that it's problematic in the international system. Today, it breaks relations even with a country like Georgia. The reasons for bad luck are the same claims, pre-conditions, which are often outrageous and absurd. So, the confessional segment does not play a role in causing problems with neighbors.
Armenia recalls an easily amenable tool used by all who need it. Regional players, the large states in the regional coordinates system knew that the material is not suitable for strategic calculations. It can be used only in tactical drafts, and even then not always.
The unenviable fate of the Armenian "state", which does not exist in reality, lies herein. But Armenia sells last thing it has. It is the county's voice in international organizations, which has the same value and weight as the voice of countries such as Fiji, Kiribati and Nauru. But, at a time of the voting on Iran, let's say on the sidelines of the UN, it can be useful. But who can guarantee that Yerevan will not substitute its southern ally, under the pressure of the new Western friends?
Most likely, when the fateful moment for Tehran comes, Yerevan will escape into the bushes to find a justification for its own venality. And it is also in the spirit of the Armenian political culture - to say neither 'no' nor 'yes' when a serious issue requires a clarity.
This brings to mind the history of the Karabakh. Armenians have turned the situation of "neither war nor peace" in saving chip, to hide behind mediators.
But the situation around Iran, which is increasingly disappointed in protégé, becomes more serious. Yerevan feels the approach of a test hour for its loyalty. Any rotation will put Armenia under attack.
Focus on Iran's economy and assistance of the northern neighbor puts Armenia into awkward situation. The room for maneuver is rapidly shrinking, not only for Iranians, but also for Armenians. This happens whenever there are distortions in the spectrum of geopolitical priorities.