Azerbaijan, Baku, Sept. 26 / Trend , E.Ostapenko, T.Konyayeva/
The United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Glyn Davies spoke with Trend Persian Desk in an exclusive interview.
Trend : During our interview with the Iranian representative in the IAEA Ali Asger Soltaniyyeh, he said that Iran sufficiently cooperates within the frameworks of the IAEA's regulations. What do think about such a statement?
Glyn Davies: The IAEA Director General and Secretariat repeatedly have reported that Iran's cooperation is insufficient, and that is the opinion that matters most.
In his opening remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors on September 7, 2009, Director General Mohammed ElBaradei said, "Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues, detailed fully and completely in the Agency's reports, which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme."
Furthermore, Iran has refused to implement Code 3.1 modified which requires that Iran provide early design information on its nuclear facilities. The IAEA has made clear that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend its adherence to this Code and thus this remains an area of Iranian noncooperation.
Q: Before this, the USA presented the documents confirming the military objective in Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Official Tehran stated that these documents are frauds. Why did not the USA present the originals of these documents to the IAEA?
A: The IAEA's understanding of Iran's weaponization efforts is based on multiple sources, including information derived from the IAEA's own investigations.
The most recent IAEA report on Safeguards Implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran said, "as the Director General has repeatedly emphasized, the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme".
In addition, Iran has confirmed that some of the information the IAEA has presented to Iran is factually accurate, and the Director General has reported that the Agency "does not consider that Iran has adequately addressed the substance of the issues." The Director General noted that "the Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency".
Q: Before this, Egypt and Syria gave the information on the traces of enriched uranium to the IAEA. Are the discussions and investigations of this matter still kept going?
A: The IAEA has issued four reports relating to Syria's nuclear activities since the Al-Kibar reactor was destroyed in September 2007.
While we cannot discuss the report in detail, the IAEA Director General makes clear that Syria has unfortunately chosen to continue to deny the Agency the access and cooperation necessary to address its outstanding questions about Syria's nuclear activities.
It has been over a year since Syria allowed a one-time visit of IAEA inspectors to the al Kibar site and has yet to provide any access to additional suspected sites. Syria has also not yet allowed Agency inspectors access to the debris and equipment removed from al Kibar.
For the Agency to answer the multiple outstanding questions related to scope of Syria's clandestine nuclear activities, it is essential that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA, including by granting inspectors access to the Al-Kibar facility and other suspected sites.
This access is important regardless of the results of the follow-up inspection at the separate declared facility.
As for Egypt, we expect and have every confidence that any questions that may have arisen will be addressed as appropriate by the IAEA and Egypt.
Q: Iran enabled the IAEA to observe the heavy water production plant in Arak a year after. How much do these observations guarantee the peaceful nature of this plant producing Plutonium?
A: The Director General's report indicated that Iran permitted the IAEA to conduct a Design Information Verification (DIV) inspection at the Arak reactor. This development is, of course, welcome. However, access granted after a year of defiance is not something to be congratulated.
Moreover, Iran's continued refusal to implement Code 3.1 modified of its Safeguards Agreement, to provide early notification of new nuclear facilities, disconcertingly suggests that this access will not be routine or regularized, as required by Iran's safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements, but rather will be ad hoc and last-minute when politically expedient.
The limits placed by Iran even on this one opportunity to conduct safeguards at the Arak reactor revealed further the lack of Iranian cooperation.
The report clearly indicates that, while Iran continues to make significant progress at Arak, Iran has yet to provide critical, detailed design information, in particular about the nuclear fuel characteristics, fuel handling and transfer equipment, and the nuclear material accountancy and control system.
This information is fundamental to safeguards implementation and should be provided without delay.
Without continuing access to new nuclear facilities, the IAEA is unable to verify the peaceful nature of those facilities.
We should also note that Arak isn't yet producing any plutonium but could produce 1-2 weapons worth once operational. Failure to provide consistent access could mean that nuclear material is at greater risk of diversion.
As the Director General noted in his report, Iran is the only state with significant nuclear activities that has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1.
Similarly, over a year ago, the Director General requested Design Information Verification information for the new power reactor Iran plans to construct at Darkhovin. And once again, Iran has refused to provide such information to the IAEA.
The failure to apply Code 3.1 modified is a serious impediment to the IAEA's ability to properly safeguard and verify nuclear activities in Iran.
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