Kazakhstan: politics and economy during crisis

Vitaliy Volkov, Deutsche Welle

Global economic crisis has severely affected Kazakhstan's economy. Can opposition to significantly change the situation in the country for the better during the crisis period?

Recently, the opposition in Kazakhstan has been noticeable active. First, there was an attempt to join forces, and then followed by a call to the people to take to streets to protest against Astana's policy on May 1. Russian expert on post-Soviet area Natalia Kharitonova answers the questions of whether opposition has enough authority amongst people and what worries its leaders and the current power in the country.

Deutsche Welle: To what extent can we say that it would be better for the people to understand the opposition on the background of a general crisis?

Natalia Kharitonova: I suppose that at present the people do not trust the opposition more than the authorities. Moreover, the external opposition, which is abroad, is mostly in Europe. For example, we inform the people that Rahat Aliyev, who arouses a negative response belongs the opposition in the West. Constructive suggestions, which can indeed be included in the rhetoric of the external opposition, just are impeded.

There is another reason for people's scepsis - external opposition is annoying, because it binds stably at the mental level with the process of migration of capital abroad and attempt to escape punishment in the country for the crimes of economic nature. And if the opposition tries to stir up the people via using the crisis, then it will be a double-edged weapon. The Kazakh authorities can use this effect in their favor - try to redirect the people's dissatisfaction toward the external opposition. This step could serve an additional "valve to exhaust steam".

But it seems the Kazakh government needs additional opportunities of sewage of people's discontent, especially in light of suits made to the enormous amount inspired by the external opposition. A current example is BTA Bank shareholders' suit.

And what worries the current Kazakh authorities first?

At the moment the Kazakh government must solve an enormous number of problems that it had to shift to the mode of "manual control" of economy. I stress that such severe crisis caused the openness of Kazakhstan, to which the country has persistently sought to integrate into the global economic system. Previously openness yielded its fruits, but now it has caused such rapid and profound response of the country's economy to failure of global financial system, which other Central Asian countries could considerably escape.

At least, we can note the issue of capital export and legally-grounded possibility of arrest of assets belonging to the country, almost in any jurisdiction outside Kazakhstan in accordance with bilateral agreements on investment protection. The matter is the country's stability. I think this is one of the most pressing issues at the moment. Indeed, the current government still intends to maintain the openness of the system, knowing that the West sooner or later will leave the crisis. But it is necessary to survive this period without disruption, the more so that the neighbors in the region cannot support the stabilization efforts due different reasons. And the second concern of Astana is primarily addressed to Tashkent, despite Karimov's jealously attitude to Kazakhstan.

As you mentioned, a number of prominent leaders who call themselves opposition live in the West. Kazhegeldin, then known as such, has gained Aliyev. Most recent reports said that Ablyazov has appeared in Europe who is said to be opposition politicians. Do these leaders of the mood and the ability to conduct coordinated policy action?

There is phrase "money sticks to money." Many of those who have moved substantial funds from the republic are announced oppositionist in the West. A criminal case has been filed in Kazakhstan against a number of Kazakh businessmen in the West. This is an additional incentive to coordinate action. The ground for coordination of actions is not hard to find. There is a need first of all to prove one's being opposition and democracy in the public field and offer efforts to impact on Kazakhstan in the margins. This gives confidence that the country of the host will react negatively to Astana's attempts to extradite them to their homeland or to submit them to justice in the West.

An important question is promises to Western investors "to help" in the return of loans. Kazakhstan understands that the presence of such persons in the status of political opposition appears to be a major factor not only foreign but also domestic policy.

With respect to the outermost opposition, former personal dislike easily seems to go to second place on the backdrop of common interests. For example, I dare say that the oppositionists like ex-deputy head of Kazakhstan's Aliyev National Security Committee can find common interests with his previous intransigent opponent, ex-head of BTA Bank Ablyazov. But I am afraid that interests of the opponents very far from today's concerns of the political opposition inside the country. Aliyev will claim to power in future, but he is in a difficult position even in the West because of its past. But Ablyazov has a way to put pressure on Astana in the form of shareholder lawsuits, but there is no lobby in the elites which is an excellent field for trade both between themselves and with authorities in Kazakhstan.

Kazhegeldin stands alone. He has lived in the West for a long tine. He can enter into any alliances there in a bid to put pressure on the Kazakh elite. But he is a true politician and has a real party with branches in the local level, with a working machine and a respect for power. If he could help the authorities to conduct a coordinated anti-crisis program with the West specifically especially in the financial sector, given its influence in the West, I think he had a chance to return to the policy of Kazakhstan confirming that the course of Nazarbayev's "Path to Europe" was grounded even during the crisis.