Baku, Azerbaijan, Oct. 19
By Alan Hope - Trend:
On Oct. 1, Spain’s autonomous region of Catalonia, defying Madrid’s warnings, had staged a unilateral referendum on independence, which was preceded by a secession campaign full of Nazi slogans advocating Catalan supremacy.
While Spain’s future as a unitary state, as well as its political system and economic prosperity hang in limbo, the world awaits Barcelona’s response to the deadline on clarification of the independence declaration set for 10 A.M. on Oct. 19.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of high-ranking European politicians, concerned with the possibility of a dramatic uprising of separatism in the Union, swirl away from the previous “internal issue of Spain” interpretation of events, urging Madrid to firm its grip and even support Rajoy’s threat of a “nuclear option,” the enactment of Article 155.
Referendum in a scope
At first glance, Catalan referendum should have had a limited geopolitical scope, since the Generalitat’s government has reaffirmed its pro-Europe nature, while the fringe of the parliamentary leftists had proposed a non-committed Republican form of a state.
Nevertheless, the events have raised tensions within the EU and created a chain of additional institutional difficulties, which, on top of Macron proposed EU reform initiative, present particular interest to three other players, having outstanding issues with Brussels – the Transatlantic Union (US and UK), Russia and China.
EU’s “double standards”
The first key element to understanding the problems created by the Catalan referendum for EU is based on the European attitude towards the “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” principles of the Helsinki Accords.
For a long time EU politicians had exercised the Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi (What is permissible for Jupiter is not for cattle) principle, supporting separatists in Eastern Europe (Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc.), while bashing the unionists by accusing them of violating Helsinki Accords' “Human Rights” principles.
Well, sooner or later this kind of mistreatment and mismanagement of the Helsinki Act was bound to backfire. As such, ignited by the Catalan events, residents in Italy’s Northern League-governed Lombardy and Veneto regions, seeking greater autonomy from Rome, will hold their own referendum on Oct. 22.
Thus, it is not surprising that the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker had openly voiced his concern over a possibility of unmanageable 98, rather than currently barely manageable 28 states having their say on Brussels' future.
EU’s decision on Catalonia
The second element of the puzzle is associated with the dilemma of a quick resolution for Catalonia’s probable new role. The proclamation of Catalan independence had created pressing matters of institutional instability and the ensued thereafter lack of control, especially over the Spanish economy.
Europe is currently facing a dilemma of a forced decision. EU can’t abandon Madrid, since that would create a serious problem for the Union’s internal credibility, nor leave Catalonia “out in the cold,” since losing London (Brexit) and Barcelona in a short time frame would create an enormous economic turmoil.
Legal way out
Taking into consideration that the existing EU treaties do not provide any legal precedence for the direction, Brussels is stuck with a not-so-straightforward political solution. The scenario of Catalonia being left out of the EU or the Spanish pride being hurt by the acceptance of a new Catalan member state is unacceptable to all the parties involved.
Thus, the very complex decision, in view of the geopolitical ramifications, will have to include EU lead mediation of the long-lasting negotiations, while keeping the current status quo of indecision. On the other hand, if Puigdemont stands on his decision of independence, EU will be forced to throw its full support of Rajoy’s enactment of harsh methods of resolve.
The outcomes for EU
Notwithstanding the outcome of the Oct. 19 “Mexican standoff”, few things have already become quite clear.
First of all, the policy of bias and “double standards” has created a “frozen conflict” within the EU territory, hopefully without any future military confrontation, yet full of human rights violations.
Secondly, since the revolution “like Saturn, devours its children,” current rulers of Madrid and Barcelona, will in all probability lose their current political support, as witnessed by protests in Galicia and Catalonia.
Third, accepting Catalan independence will set precedence to the other disaffected nationalities of not only Spain, but UK, France, Germany, Italy etc.
Finally, though not claimed as of yet, there are no guarantees that an independent Catalan state will not have any future territorial claims to its neighbors (i.e. Roussillon province of France populated by Catalans).
What about NATO?
In the mayhem of the events, the issue of security, for now left in the background, will undoubtedly create another headache for EU. Distracted by the institutional instability issues, Europeans have completely forgotten that Spain has been an indispensable NATO member since 1982 and the views of member states of the Alliance, which is not entirely comprised of EU countries, will undoubtedly differ from the Brussels' own.
Notwithstanding the EU decision on the form of Catalonia’s acceptance, the breakaway autonomy cannot become a part of the Alliance in any form, de-jure, since it should be accepted by a unanimous vote, and de-facto, since it doesn’t possess any military capabilities, thus can’t be possibly integrated into the NATO structure.
The Transatlantic angle
Since the Brexit had already strengthened the hereditary Anglo-Saxon alliance, the Transatlantic Union stands first in the line of interest.
United States’ diplomatic recognition of any new “self-determined” nation doesn’t depend on the president’s whim or the powerful machinery of Congress. By accepting Catalan independence the US might itself face the same type secessionist threats in Texas and California.
Meanwhile, Brexiting United Kingdom has already stopped acting as a bridge between the US and EU, thus rendering it in search of a new role on the geopolitical theater. On the other hand, in view of the Gibraltar issue still lurking in the background, an “under the table” axis between London and Barcelona might become as much science-fictional as the UK-Chile alliance was once estimated.
In any case, the Transatlantic Union could, if deemed necessary, become instrumental in the amendment of the continental map, thus creating enormous difficulties for Brussels and isolating it from the prime player position on the European stage.
The Russian angle
Though a probable Anglo-Saxon competition is of some concern for Brussels, there is a common understanding that it is an internal competition between allies. In contrast, the hypothesis that an independent Catalonia would cozy up to Russia, presents a true nightmare for Brussels.
Russia has been very cautious in taking a stand on the Catalan secession, as its supposed involvement and support of the separatists was already alleged by some of EU politicians. Nonetheless, Russia has always been viewed as keen player of the “tit-for-tat” strategy (i.e. Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Crimea and Syria). Thus, even a hypothetical scenario for the mythical possibility of a Russian military base near Barcelona sends chills up the spines of many European politicians.
China’s angle
On top of Russia’s possible rapprochement of Catalonia, Brussels is even more concerned by a potential Chinese involvement in the matter. In this case, the ideological and military components are outweighed by the economic ones.
China with its ambitious New Silk Road project, aims to reconfigure world commerce around Beijing’s interests. This initiative is designed to change the economic structure of the entire world, and has already had an enormous impact in Asia and Africa. Moreover, China has already managed to get a foothold in the Balkans (especially in Serbia) and has obtained some facilities in Greece.
Given the opportunity, China would not stand oddly by, but will try to incorporate the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona as a major part of its trade strategy.
United we stand, divided we fall
The possibility that any of the mentioned parties could take an advantage of the Catalan secession gravely complicates Brussels’ response to threats, and, at the same time, given the intransigence of both sides, poses serious difficulties as much for Madrid as for Barcelona.
Nonetheless, standing decision on independence, which already has gravely wounded region’s economy, will surely isolate Catalonia even further. Furthermore, in view of EU’s permanently skidding bureaucratic machine, which has impended Union’s ability to reach any decision in a timely matter, Catalonia should reconsider its secession from Spain.