Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation, especially for Trend
Russia is racing to establish military presence in Abkhazia, with power projection capabilities throughout South Caucasus. The Russian Air Force wants a piece of action as well, in addition to its integrated air defense system with Armenia.
Bombora near Gudauta is the largest military airfield in the Southern Caucasus, boasting a 4-kilometer long runway. The runway ends less than 100 meters from the sea, allowing aircraft to take off at very low altitudes over the sea and proceed undetected by enemy radar in the initial phases of flight. This may be particularly important for potential operations against NATO countries, including Turkey, and Ukraine.
In the Soviet times, Gudauta air base was could accommodate all types of military aircraft, including fighter jets, close air support, and heavy military transport. The airbase used to host a separate paratroops regiment and was among the first airbases to receive the Soviet Sukhoi-27 fighter jets (NATO designation - Flanker). Sukhoi fighters also operated out of Bombora against Georgian troops and aircraft in the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war. At that time, the Russian military ran the base.
At the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit, President Boris Yeltsin committed Russia to withdrawing from its military bases in Georgia, including Gudauta base. The Russian military let its displeasure widely known.
In 2001, Moscow declared that it has withdrawn from Gudauta - a claim Tbilisi has contested
continuously. According to Gazeta.ru, the Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indirectly confirmed the presence of the Russian aircraft in Gudauta after the alleged withdrawal.
In the recent 2008 conflict, Russian airborne troops, which fought the Georgian army in western Georgia, landed in Bombora. One cannot rule out the use of the base in the future operations in the region, beyond Georgia.
Whether the Russian military ever fully left the airbase or not, there is now question that it is now officially returning. According to a source in the Russian Ministry of Defense, Moscow plans to deploy some 20 aircraft, including a wing of the Su-27s (Flanker), a squadron of the Su-25s (Frogfoot) attack aircraft, and several An-26 (Curl) transport aircraft. The same source identifies "deterrence of Georgia" as the main mission of the base.
Moscow also says that the restored airbase in Abkhazia is necessary to provide proper security for the 2014 Sochi Olympics - but this explanation is risible.
The Price of Expansion.
Deployment of Russian naval, air and land power, including some 3,700 troops in the Kodori Gorge, in separatist Abkhazia, brings additional threats to the sovereignty of South Caucasus, threatening the Western export routes of oil and gas. This move will inevitably worsen the relations between Russia and the European Union and the United States, as well as further poison the ties between Moscow and Tbilisi.
NATO has voiced concern over the new bases. The U.S. and the EU have accused Russia of violating the ceasefire agreement, which called for limiting Russia's military presence in Abkhazia after the August 2008 war. Russia, in turn, accuses the U.S. of supporting Tbilisi and aiding in the reconstruction and development of Georgia's military capabilities.
The Russian military presence in Abkhazia is likely to turn into a chronic and painful affliction in the US-Russian relations for decades to come, but apparently someone in the Russian armed forces does not mind. Neither does the Kremlin.
With additional warships, fighter aircraft and military personnel near the Black Sea coast of Georgia, Russia is challenging the position of the United States, which has recently signed a Strategic Partnership Charter with Tbilisi. There are broader implications to Russian attempts to control Georgian coastal waters and air space. The US may need the Georgian ports to supply Azerbaijan in case of a conflagration with Iran, or to support a deployment in Afghanistan or Central Asia. This is a particularly acute issue now, that the Manas base will be closed due to the Russian pressure, and a land/water route via Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and possibly Uzbekistan may be needed.
In summer 2008, American warships were still able to enter the Georgian waters to deliver humanitarian aid for the war victims. The question is what would happen in the future?
- Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Catherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation and the author of Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence (Central Asia Caucasus Institute, SAIS Johns Hopkins, 2008).
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of Trend