Azerbaijan, Baku, Oct.12 / Trend, T.Konyayeva /
Iran's claims about its capabilities, plans and intentions would be more credible under Iran's transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said the U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Glyn Davies.
"Iran would be in a dramatically better position to achieve its peaceful nuclear goals by cooperating with the IAEA, meeting its international obligations, and demonstrating that its nuclear program is exclusively peacefully intended, Davies told in an exclusive interview with Trend. If Iran were transparent with the IAEA, its claims about its capabilities, plans, and intentions would be more credible."
Over the past five years, Iran has repeatedly stated about various achievements in the field of nuclear development, as well as its plans to further develop the country's nuclear program, despite the resolution adopted by the IAEA, the UN Security Council and international sanctions.
Davies believes the lack of credibility between what Iran says it will do with its enriched uranium, and what its program seems designed to actually accommodate, is a key underlying concern for the international community.
"For example, Iran claims that the Fordow Enrichment Plant at Qom is designed to produce fuel for its peaceful reactors, he said. However, Fordow is designed to house 3000 centrifuges, which could only supply a tiny fraction of what would be required to fuel even one reactor. But a 3000 centrifuge facility is of an appropriate scale for a nuclear weapons program."
Located in 35 kilometers north of the Qom City, Fordow Enrichment Plant is located on the territory of Iran's military base and is well protected from air strike: anti-aircraft system and the position for the medium-range missiles have been installed around it. Iran has already warned the IAEA that Fordow will not come into operation until the spring of 2011. According to the information of Guardian, the size of the interior area of the plant is such that its capacity will be limited to 3,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium. As of February 16, 2010, there are no gas centrifuges at the plant, but all the necessary communications have been provided.
According to ambassador, the activities and equipment required are precluded by IAEA Board of Governor and UN Security Council resolutions.
"Iran's announced production of near 20% uranium is further evidence of Iran's violation of its international obligations and further lowers confidence in Iran's peaceful intent and willingness to reach a negotiated solution," said Davies.
In February, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran officially confirmed the beginning of work on the production of uranium with a 20-percentage-235 isotope. The head of the organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, said for it, a separate cascade of centrifuges for isotope separation has been created. According to him, it is capable to produce monthly up to five kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium for Tehran research reactor.
"While Iran claims to be producing this material for use in fabricating fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, Iran has no demonstrated capability to produce fuel and use it safely in a reactor, Davies said. To date, Iran has never produced fuel for any reactor in Iran."
According to him, enrichment to 20%, however, can instead serve as a virtual dry run for taking the small additional step of producing weapons-grade uranium.
Since November of last year, Iran's reserves of low-enriched uranium (LEU) increased up to 2,800 kg, or more than 50 percent. Iran currently has enough LEU for production of two nuclear bombs, but the enrichment process continues. To make a nuclear bomb, uranium-235 content must not be below 90 percent, so for the production of nuclear fuel, a complex process of uranium enrichment is applied to increase the share of uranium-235.
According to the provisions of the IAEA, the uranium enriched to a level below 20 percent is considered low-enriched fuel. All those that are enriched by more than 20 percent are is highly enriched uranium.
"If Iran wants to build international confidence, it needs to suspend its enrichment activities and comply with its international obligations," Davies said.
According to him, while Iran appears to have produced single fuel rods and may well produce more, it has never produced actual fuel and used such fuel to operate a reactor.
"The IAEA has noted that Iran has not declared any capability that would allow it to produce fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. Should Iran attempt to do so without following proper licensing/safety procedures, a serious safety issue could arise," he said.
In late September, Tehran announced that Iran started the development of special technology needed to create fuel rods, and that within a year Iran will make the necessary fuel.
The fuel rod is a cylindrical container containing cleavable (capable of being split) materials such as uranium-235.
The ambassador also noted that the IAEA has no information regarding Iran's claims about the beginning of the program for the production of electricity by nuclear fusion.
"We do not have detailed comment on these latest Iranian claims of nuclear prowess, but we note that Iran has on many occasions exaggerated its capabilities," Davies said.
In July, Iranian authorities announced the beginning of a program to develop an experimental reactor for nuclear fusion. The head of the Iranian Nuclear Fusion Research Institute, Asghar Sedikzade, said that two years are necessary for the initial development, and the reactor itself will be built within 10 years.
According to Salehi, the budget of Nuclear Fusion Research Institute will be $8 million, but it will take 20-30 years to make it repaying.
According to experts, the nuclear fusion in the future could become practically inexhaustible source of energy for the whole world, as the main raw material for the process is hydrogen, which is extracted from the water. The advantages of this energy source could be considered the absence of combustion, small amounts of waste and high efficiency of the process.